Considerations in Disciplining Employees for Participation in Violations of the No-Strike Clause by Editors,
1958]
NOTES
CONSIDERATIONS IN DISCIPLINING EMPLOYEES FOR
PARTICIPATION IN VIOLATIONS OF THE
NO-STRIKE CLAUSE
The year 1957 saw fewer man-hours lost through strikes than any
preceding post-war year.1 Nevertheless, the primary aim of management
in the field of labor continues to be to eliminate or at least minimize work
stoppages.2 To do this, management must find penalties for unprotected
work stoppages which will achieve the greatest deterrent force consistent
with avoidance of undue prejudice to labor-management relations. Theo-
retically, the employer has an arsenal of remedies from which he can
choose--directed against the union 3 or against the individual employees
who participate in the stoppage. Recent cases and publications have in-
dicated the legal obstacles and impracticalities involved in actions against
the union.4 It is the purpose of this Note to survey the contractual limita-
tions on the employer's power to discipline individual employees for their
participation in unprotected stoppages, and to suggest the considerations
which should have a part in assessing the penalty.
I. CONTRACTUAL CHALLENGES TO THE EMPLOYER'S
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Basically, a concerted work stoppage is an activity "protected" by
section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act.5 An employer subjected to a protected
strike can hire replacements for the strikers and need not discharge these
replacements when the strikers apply for work,6 but discrimination against
applicants on the basis of participation or leadership in the stoppage is
an unfair labor practice Work stoppages lose this statutory protection'
under certain conditions. The most common of these is when they are in
1. N. Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1957, p. 15, col. 5.
2. Toar, Comurrivi BAAxINING 91 (1953).
3. These include such things as a lockout, state court injunction, damage suit
against the union, and contract rescission. See Daykin, Liability of Unions and Em-
ployers Under the Labor Management Relations Act, 42 IoWA L. REv. 370 (1957);
Ezrine, Nadir of the No-Strike Clause, 8 LAB. L.J. 769 (1957).
4. See ABA Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Employer
Contracts, The No-Strike Clause, in ABA, PROCDINGS OV Tl r SrCTION oN LABOR
LAw 55 (1952) (hereinafter cited as The No-Strike Clause) ; Chamberlain, Collective
Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 COLUm. L. Rbv. 829, 841 (1948) ; Wolk &
Nix, Work Stoppage Provisions in Union Agreements, 34 MONTHLY LAB. Riv. 272
(1952).
5. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
6. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
7. Ibid.
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breach of a no-strike clause s but they are also unprotected when the
dispute is arbitrable, when the activity is more disruptive than an ordinary
strike' or when the activity is not directed to the common welfare
of the workers.'1 Most of the cases considered herein involve violations
of the no-strike clause. However, the thoughts on disciplinary action will
generally apply as well to other unprotected activities. Participants in
unprotected stoppages may be discharged and otherwise discriminated
against on the basis of their participation or leadership in the strike.'2  The
Act does not prevent the employer from rehiring some employees and
refusing to rehire others on this basis.'8
Even though the employer's disciplinary action may not be a violation
of the Taft-Hartley Act, it may be subject to challenge through the
grievance and arbitration procedure as a violation of the contract with the
union. Two-thirds of the contracts covered in a recent survey provided
for review of the employer's discipline by some form of grievance or
arbitration procedure.' 4  Since a work stoppage could easily be used by
an employer to justify discipline against objectionable union leaders or
others whose real offenses lie in directions other than this work stoppage,
the union must have some safeguard against these abuses. It would appear
that only those contracts which expressly bar review 1 should be con-
strued to deny this challenge. It should be noted that, although the union
is challenging the employer's action, when the penalty is submitted to
arbitration the employer has the burden of proving that there was a viola-
tion of the no-strike clause and that the disciplined grievant participated
in it.1s
8 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
9. W. L. Meade, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 217 F.2d
6 (1st Cir. 1954), cert. disnmissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
10. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1938).
11. NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL, 346 U.S. 464
(1953).
12. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
13. The employer may have violated the act if it rehires on the basis of union
as opposed to strike activity. Although employees who engage in unprotected activi-
ties themselves lose the protection of the act (NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d
212 (5th Cir. 1953); Michigan Lumber Fabricators, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 579 (1955))
those employees who were reinstated and those in the bargaining unit who were not
discharged remain protected. To discriminate against their leaders for union activity
would appear to abrogate their rights under section 8(b) (3). 49 STAT. 452 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952).
14. BNA, CoLLc'riV BARGAINING NncOrIATIONS & CONTRAcTS 40:4 (1956) (here-
inafter cited as CBNC). See Skenandoa Rayon Corp., 21 Lab. Arb. 421 (I. R. Feinberg
1953) (In this Note the name preceding date is that of arbitrator.) ; contract between
American Air Filter Co. and United Automobile Workers, CBNC 77:326 (1956).
15. E.g., Lever Bros-Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL, con-
tract, "The Union shall not question the unqualified right of the Company to discipline
or discharge employees engaged in participating in or encouraging unauthorized strikes.
CBNC 51:424. Cf. Diamond Alkali Co.-District 50, UMW contract, in which the
company agrees not to sue the union for damages from strikes unless the union
opposes company discipline against the participants. CBNC 51:442.
16. McLouth Steel Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 761 (G. E. Bowles 1955) ; Standard Steel
Spring Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 423 (H. H. Platt 1951). However, the burden may be met by
circumstantial evidence. Bower Roller Bearing Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 320 (G. E. Bowles
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Some contracts provide that once the arbitrator has found that the
grievant participated in the stoppage he has no power to reduce the
penalty imposed by management.' 7 Even in the absence of such a clause,
a few arbitrators have held they cannot modify the penalty where the sub-
mission is merely whether the penalty was given for just cause.' 8 How-
ever, most conclude that they do have the power on the theory that it is
necessary to make a final determination of the dispute.'9 When the arbi-
trator assumes this power the employer must not only sustain the burden
of proof as to the employee's participation, but must also justify the
severity of the penalty 20 and any distinction in penalty between vari-
ous participants in the stoppage.21 An example of the operation of
this procedure arose in McLouth Steel Corporation 22 where the employer
discharged two of the fifty participants in a wildcat strike. The arbitrator
stated that the contract standard applied by labor-management arbitrators
in reviewing differentiation of penalties was not the same as that applied
by the NLRB where a finding of participation in an unprotected stoppage
ends the inquiry. Rather collective bargaining contracts require a de-
termination of relative guilt among the employees. Proof of instigation
of the wildcat strike would have supported the extreme penalty of dis-
charge, but the company failed to prove that the two grievants, though more
active in the stoppage than the other participants, incited or maintained
1954) (Steward talked to men in the dressing room after which they all walked out.) ;
Bethlehem Steel Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 99 (M. M. Shipman 1951) (Employee told everyone
grievance meeting had been unsuccessful and walkout followed.).
17. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 544 (A. E. Ralston 1952);
Stewart-Warner Corp.-International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL, contract,
CBNC 77:326. But see United States Steel-United Steelworkers, CIO, contract,
"Should it be determined by the board that an employee has been suspended or dis-
charged for cause, the board shall not have jurisdiction to modify the degree of
discipline imposed by the company; provided, however, that in a case arising out
of a strike or work stoppage involving a group of employees and in which the com-
pany imposed discipline on part but not all such employees the board shall have
discretion, if it finds the employees disciplined are less guilty than other employees
not disciplined, to modify the penalties. . . ." CBNC 51:266.
18. Chattanooga Box & Lumber Co., 10 Lab. Arb. 260, 261 (W. P. McCoy
1948) ; Petro, Collective Bargaining and the Individual Employees, in NYU, EIGHTH
ANNUAL CONVORMNC4 ON LABOR 239 (1955).
19. Underwood Glass Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 614 (J. M. Klamon 1956); Huntington
Chair Corp., 17 Lab. Arb. 440 (R. N. Latture 1951). See Justin, Arbitrator's Authority
in Disciplinary Cases, 8 Arn. J. (n.s.) 68 (1953) ; Platt, The Arbitration Process in the
Settlement of Labor Disputes, 31 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 54, 58 (1947). A few contracts
give the arbitrator this power specifically. E.g., Fall River & New Bedford Cotton
Manufacturers Ass'n-Textile Workers, CIO, CBNC 77:326.
20. Green River Steel Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 774 (J. F. Sembower 1955); Fabet Corp.,
12 Lab. Arb. 1126 (S. Wallen 1949).
21. Bethlehem Steel Co., 29 Lab. Arb., 635 (R. T. Seward 1957); Aurora Gaso-
line Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 495 (R. G. Howlett 1957). A few contracts confine the arbi-
trator's power to determining only whether the employee violated the contract. Ameri-
can Zinc Co.-Zinc Workers Union, CIO, contract, CBNC 40:18. Compare U. S.
Steel contract, supra note 17. There have also been a few cases in which arbitrators
lacking power to reduce penalties have suggested that they be reduced. Colonial Pro-
vision Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 610 (M. Copelof 1951); Borg-Warner Corp., 4 Lab. Arb.
4 (C. M. Updegraff 1945).
22. 24 Lab. Arb. 761 (G. E. Bowles 1955).
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it. Therefore, the two were reinstated with written warnings and ten
days' loss of pay.
For the most part these challenges are in the hands of the union.
Although an employee may bring an unfair labor practice charge against
an employer without the concurrence of the bargaining agent,2 and a few
contracts provide the employee with power to take his grievance to arbi-
tration without such concurrence,24 the employee must largely rely on
the union to champion his cause.2 Since most employers are subject to
union challenge by these procedures, they must abide by the contract as it
is likely to be construed by an arbitrator.
II. THE PERMISSIBLE RANGE OF PENALTIES AND THE PROCEDURES
FOR THEIR IMPOSITION
A. Range of Penalties
The evolution of contract clauses calling for penalties against indi-
vidual violators of the no-strike clause has paralleled the disclaimers of
union liability which followed the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act.
26
It is now estimated that more than two-fifths of the collective bargaining
agreements in effect specify that individual participants may be disciplined.
27
Even in the absence of such a clause the employer has this power,28 since
the individual employees are bound by the agreement signed by their bar-
gaining representative even when persuaded to violate the agreement by
their union. The company would find little advantage in collective
bargaining if the workers were not bound by these agreements. In addi-
tion, the concession of the union in agreeing to a no-strike clause will
generally have been balanced by concessions made by the employer.
23. NLRB v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 217 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1954);
Borg-Warner Corp., 4 Lab. Arb. 4, 7 (C. M. Updegraff 1945).
24. See Everett Dyers & Cleaners, 11 Lab. Arb. 462 (A. H. Myers 1948). Contra,
contracts between Central States Carriers and International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL, CBNC 77:301; George Groton Machine Co. and Machinists, CBNC 77:325.
25. See Anson v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 248 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1957);
Arsenault v. General Elec. Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 413, 137 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct. 1957).
This subject has been treated in Lenhoff, The Effect of Labor Arbitration Clauses
Upon the Individual, 9 Aim. J. (as.) 3 (1954) ; Note, Rights of Individual Workers in
Union-Management Arbitration Proceedings, 66 YALE L.J. 946 (1957).
26. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952). It was felt by many com-
mentators that the amendments would make the union liable in damages even though
the strike might not have been authorized. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 1947, 61 HA~v. L. Rv. 274, 311-12 (1948) ; Note, Union Re-
sponsibility for Acts of Officers and Members Under the LMRA, 49 CoLuM. L. Rv.
384 (1949) (These prophesies have not been borne out. E.g., United Construction
Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
847 (1955).). As a result many unions were able to get stipulations against liability
or at least to eliminate liability except where the strike was authorized by the union.
CBNC 77:3. To replace union liability, the contracts often specified discipline against
the individual participants. The No-Strike Clause 10.
27. See CBNC 77:4.
28. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); Parkway Baking Co., 21
Lab. Arb. 736 (B. F. Boyer 1953).
29. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 681 (H. T. Dworkin 1957); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 557 (W. P. McCoy 1952).
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Although many contracts provide that violation of the no-strike clause
is just cause for discipline including discharge,30 some limit the employer's
sanctions to lesser penalties 3 such as warnings which go on the employee's
record, 2 layoff33 and loss of seniority.34  In the absence of a contrary
contract clause the employer is limited to these penalties and cannot assess
a money penalty against the strikers. Arbitrators have held that an em-
ployer cannot reduce the base pay of workers who are on an incentive
program when they stage a slowdown 5 nor can he dock their holiday
pay. 6 A few cases have gone beyond these limits and permitted novel
penalties. Thus, in M. Singer & Sons 3 7 the arbitrator was asked to
devise a penalty for a union-authorized refusal to cross a sister-union's
picket line. He decided that money damages would lead to a regeneration
of antagonism, and penalized the contract violators by requiring the em-
ployees to make up the lost production without pay. Since the strike is
a violation of the contract, it would seem that the penalty should be one
foreseeable by the breacher. The traditional penalties of warning, layoff,
loss of seniority, and discharge have this advantage and appear to be ade-
quate in t.hnost all situations to deter future contract violations.
As proper industrial discipline is considered by most arbitrators to be
corrective rather than punitive, the end must be to instill self-discipline
in the employees.38 Discharges, therefore, are looked on with disfavor
by arbitrators. Arthur M. Ross justified this position by the following
reasoning:
"Both employer and employee lose when the employee is
terminated. The employer must recruit and train a replacement and
must often reckon with ill will on the part of the discharged employee's
fellow workers, while the employee loses his seniority and all the
valuable rights associated with it. Therefore, discharge should
normally be invoked only as a last resort, after it has become clear
that corrective means will not succeed." 3 9
30. Local 1113, United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338
(D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 (1956); Goodyear Atomic Corp., 27 Lab.
Arb. 321 (P. N. Lehoczky 1956).
31. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 681 (H. J. Dworkin 1957); contracts
between Johns-Manville Corp. and Federal Labor Union, AFL, and between Central
States Carriers and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, CBNC 77:301.
32. Outboard Marine & M~ffg. Co., 12 Lab. Arb. 488 (J. A. Lapp 1949).
33. Bethlehem Pac. Coast Steel Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 369 (A. C. Miller 1957);
International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 121 (A. R. Marshall 1956).
34. NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1955);
NLRB v. National Die Casting Co., 207 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1953).
35. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 512 (I. B. Scheiber 1957); Armstrong Tire
& Rubber Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 544 (A. E. Ralston, Jr. 1952).
36. Parke, Davis & Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 126 (H. H. Platt 1949). Contra, Fern
Shoe Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 268 (J. A. C. Grant 1950).
37. 13 Lab. Arb. 533 (I. B. Sherber 1949).
38. Ross, What Happens After Reinstatement, in NATIONAL AcADSmY or ARaI-
TRATORS, CUTICAL ISSUzS IN LABOR ARBITRATION 21, 26-27 (1957) (hereinafter cited
as NAA, CrTICAL Issuzs).
39. Ibid.
1958]
1004 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
A recent American Arbitration Association study yields statistics which
indicate that penalties less than discharge have been upheld over twenty
per cent more often than discharges.4° Although it cannot be said that the
penalty of discharge will only be upheld if the offense is extremely
serious, such a penalty should be used only after careful consideration.
Poorly drafted contractual limitations on allowable penalties may lead
to paradoxical results in arbitration. In Sylvania Elec. Products Co.
41
the only expression in the contract dealing with discipline allowed dis-
charge for cause. In addition to a no-strike clause, the contract barred
lockouts "for any reason." Two union negotiators were discharged for
failure of security clearance, under orders of the Army. In order to coerce
the company into placing these men in non-sensitive positions until they
appealed their denials of clearance, 150 employees violated the union's
no-strike pledge and left their jobs. The company asked the union presi-
dent, on pain of discharge, to try to get the workers to return but he
refused and was discharged. Some of the 150 returned to work, but
ninety-six refused to return unless the president was also reinstated. The
company discharged the ninety-six but repented when they applied for
reinstatement and commuted their discharges to two-week layoffs. The
arbitrator held that although the company had the right to discharge the
strikers, the contract provided no right to suspend them. Characterizing
the reduced discipline as a lockout, he ruled that they should be reinstated
with pay back to the time their discharge was commuted. Thus the
greater penalty would presumably have been acceptable, whereas the
smaller was not.
To avoid encouraging discharge under contracts such as this it would
seem that a penalty listed in a contract should be construed to include all
lesser traditional penalties, unless the contract clearly specifies otherwise.
B. Procedures for Imposition
Some contracts contain procedures which the employer must follow
before a discharge or penalty becomes effective. Disciplinary action
which does not follow these procedures may deprive the employer of his
right to impose any sanction on the strikers. For example, Tran World
Airlines, Inc.43 involved a wildcat strike at the end of which the employer
informed all the strikers that they had been discharged and that they
would have to fill out application forms as new employees if they wished
to return to their jobs. The grievance provision stated that no employee
40. Procedural and Substadtive Aspects of Labor-Management Arbitration, 12ARB. J. (n.s.) 131, 137 (1957).
41. 14 Lab. Arb. 16 (S. Sugarman 1950).
42. Procedures for discipline are spelled out in over half the contracts. CBNC
40:18. They include such things as warnings, notice to the union and hearings. The
Armstrong Cork Co.-United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, CIO, con-
tract provides that the facts are to be reviewed with the union president before dis-
charge. CBNC 77:325.
43. 24 Lab. Arb. 95 (H. M. Gilden 1955).
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who had worked ninety days should be discharged without a fair hearing.
The no-strike clause, in another section of the contract, stated that the
employer reserved the right to discipline, including discharge, any em-
ployee taking part in a strike. The arbitrator held that all provisions
of the contract had to be given weight and therefore all the employees
were entitled to a hearing before discharge even though that penalty was
spelled out in the contract. The result in that case, as in most cases
where the employer fails to follow the contractual procedure, was that all
the strikers were reinstated with seniority (albeit without back pay) since
it was too late to correct the omission of a hearing. The contract in
Bethlehem Steel Co." provided that management could suspend and later
discharge any employee who violated the no-strike clause. The company
was required to give the employee a hearing and a list of reasons for the
discharge. After a wildcat strike, the employer took back all the partici-
pants except two men who incited it, and sent those two a statement that
they were being discharged for their violation of the no-strike clause.
Their discharge followed the hearing and they challenged the employer's
action through arbitration. The arbitrator held that the statement of rea-
sons limited the employer's power, and the arbitrator's power on review,
to considering only those offenses particularly charged. Therefore he
could not look into their individual part in the stoppage or their past
record, but was limited to the fact that they participated in the stoppage.
Since others who merely participated in the stoppage incurred no penalty,
the results were unequal and the dischargees were reinstated.
More than half the collective bargaining agreements in effect' contain
some procedure which the employer must follow, so these two holdings
pose an important threat to the employer's power to penalize. Such pro-
visions were bargained for by the union, and the employer should have
no right to disregard them. However, the inclusion of an arbitration
clause in the contract infers that the parties do not intend to bind each
other to the meticulous standards of procedure required by courts. The
arbitrator should look to the purpose behind the procedure outlined in the
contract; if substantial compliance in good faith by the employer has
satisfied this purpose, the arbitrator should approve. It would appear
that the hearing requirement in the TWA case was meant to give the em-
ployee a chance to plead his past record and to minimize his part in the
stoppage. This is of importance to the employee and when it is ignored
the employer rightfully should lose his power of sanction. The same
rationale is behind the Bethlehem Steel decision, but there the grant of
a hearing and the discussion of the dischargee's part in the stoppage satis-
fied the aims of the procedure.
Some contracts, instead of providing steps which the employer must
take before discipline, provide that discipline is to be administered jointly
44. 29 Lab. Arb. 635 (P. T. Seward 1957).
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by the union and management.45 In effect, they provide for collective
bargaining over penalties. 46 A few others provide that the employer
petition the union to punish the employee in the manner it thinks best,
and allow for review by an impartial referee if the employer is not satis-
fied with the sanction. 47 These provisions, as well as the notice and hear-
ing procedure outlined above, seem at first glance an inordinate limitation
on management's power to redress a contract violation. They may in
fact benefit the employer. His need for a quick-acting deterrent against
work stoppages must be balanced against his continuing need to minimize
employee antagonism. In addition, if the summary penalty is challenged
the company may be forced to reinstate a dischargee and even pay him
for the time since his discharge, adding needless expense to the fact that
the employee has escaped with no penalty whatsoever. Finally, the arbi-
trator's desire, conceded or not, to seek acceptability of his verdict from
both sides of the table" s will more often upset a disciplinary penalty
unilaterally imposed than one which has resulted from a hearing in which
the employee has been allowed to defend his actions. 49
C. Loss of Right To Penalize
The employer may lose his right to penalize the participants in the
strike, either through bargaining it away via the strike settlement 50 or
by actions towards the strikers which amount to condonation.51 Tribunals
have differed over what is required to make out a case of condonation. For
example, the National Labor Relations Board has found condonation merely
from the employer's efforts to convince the employees to return to work.
5 2
45. See contract between Electric Auto-Lite Co. and United Automobile Workers,
AFL, CBNC 51:423.
46. An elder statesman among arbitrators has suggested that this is the best
way to handle the situation. Taylor, Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitra-
tion (1949), in NATIONAL AcADEMY o ARBITRATORs, THS PRorzssioN op LABOR
ARBiTRATiON 32, 33-34 (1957).
47. See contract between Prudential Ins. Co. and Insurance Agents Int'l Union,
AFL, CBNC 40:245; Pacific Maritime Ass'n and International Longshoremen's &
Warehousemen's Union, CBNC 77:302.
48. It has been said that the criterion of mutual acceptability has a higher priority
in disciplinary actions for violation of the no-strike clause than in any other field.
Taylor, Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitration (1949), in NATIONAL
AcADmy or ARBuRArORs, THz PRo ssloN OF LABOR AaR IRATIoN 32 (1957).
49. There is some evidence that discipline for violations of the no-strike clause is
more apt to be upheld than the average case. Holly, The Arbitration of Discharge
Cases, in NAA, CRIcIc.AL Issuxs 1, 14.
50. Parke, Davis & Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 126 (H. H. Platt 1949); National Lock
Co., 12 Lab. Arb. 1194 (L. A. Rader 1949).
51. E.g., NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952) (Employer continued
to look upon strikers as employees.); NLRB v. E. A. Laboratories, Inc., 188 F.2d
885 (2d Cir. 1951) (Employer agreed to reinstate men who extorted money for labor
peace.)
52. California Cotton Cooperative Ass'n, Ltd., 110 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1954). But cf.
Administrative Ruling of NLRB Gen. Counsel, Case K-207, 37 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1956)
(employer who reinstated all strikers and discharged three after a month's investi-
gation held not to have condoned).
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The Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co.5
3
applied a more stringent standard, refusing to accede to the Board's finding
of condonation where the employer told the employees he would take them
back without seniority, and later discharged the strike leaders. An interest-
ing arbitration case in this area is Glass Container Manufacturers Institute.54
Thirty-six wildcat strikers were discharged; then fourteen rehired as new
employees. The company claimed it had treated them all alike-that it
rehired the better ones the same way it would have chosen from thirty-six
new applicants. The arbitrator held that the fourteen were never really
discharged and that the company, by failing to assess the part of each
in the stoppage, had condoned the stoppage and lost its right to penalize
any of them.
The Marshall Car Wheel and Glass Container cases can be distin-
guished but both seem correct. The employer should not be held to have
condoned a violation of the contract by taking back all the strikers on equal
terms, and should retain for a reasonable time his right to assess a penalty
based on the activities of individuals in connection with the strike. The
burden of proving condonation under these circumstances should be made
difficult because of the union's opportunity, when it has enough bargaining
power, to get a clear condonation expressed in a strike settlement agreement.
If the outcome of the strike results in the union's inability to get such a
concession, tribunals should not award what could not be secured at the
bargaining table. However, where the employer does single out employees
for special treatment as was done in the Glass Container case, he must take
the risk that if he bases his distinction on grounds not allowed by the
arbitrator's construction of the contract, he will lose his right to penalize.
III. CONSIDERATIONS IN IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES
The importance of the employer's basing his choice of penalty on
reasonable grounds arises not only from avoidance of union antagonism
but also from the fact that if the penalty is not justifiable it may be rescinded
by an arbitral decision.
Arbitrators hold that the labor-management contract entitles the
employers to discipline strikers because the grievance program generally
provides a sufficient outlet for their problems 5 and because they violated
53. 218 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1955) ; see also NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U.S. 240 (1939) (Rehiring of some sitdown strikers did not amount to condona-
tion.); contract between American Enka Corp. and United Textile Workers, AFL,
"... [B]ut rehiring any such employee shall not constitute a waiver by the Corpora-
tion of its right thereafter to take the disciplinary action as hereinbefore set forth."
CBNC 77:301.
54. 27 Lab. Arb. 131 (P. N. Lehoczky 1956).
55. Parkway Baking Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 736 (B. F. Boyer 1953). Working condi-
tions and inter-union matters caused 30% of the work stoppages in the past ten
years. Cass, The Relationship of Size of Firm and Strhike Acivity, 80 MONTnLY
LAB. Riw. 1310 (1957). These are the disputes which normally come within the
grievance procedure. Often, the no-strike clause is not applicable to disputes which
are not subject to the grievance procedure and arbitration. See CBNC 51:102-04.
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a contract they were bound to respect. 56 However, many factors should
be considered by the employer in assessing a penalty against an individual
for participation in a work stoppage, and by an arbitrator who reviews such
penalty.
A. Gravity of the Stoppage
Often contracts state that a violation of the contract should be con-
sidered just cause for discharge.57 Yet, many arbitrators consider such
a provision as indicating the maximum permissible penalty and refuse to
affirm a discharge for participation in a very short work stoppage.58 For
example, three men were discharged for instigating a mass meeting on
company time to protest the discharge of the union president in Huntington
Chair Corp.59 The arbitration was held three months after their discharge
and the arbitrator held that reinstatement without back pay would be a
penalty more in keeping with the type of stoppage involved. Some con-
tracts recognize this consideration by providing that the penalty of discharge
shall not be available where the employee returned to work within twenty-
four hours60 Since the object of the penalty is deterrence, it would appear
that the magnitude of the stoppage should be considered in assessing the
penalty. If discharge is the penalty for a ten-minute stoppage, once a
stoppage has begun, the employees may be encouraged to continue to use
economic pressure in the hope that they can win reinstatement as part of
the strike settlement. Only where they can hope for a smaller penalty will
they be encouraged to end the strike early.
B. Dispute Which Caused the Stoppage
1. Near-Protected Activities
In some instances the dispute which caused the stoppage is determina-
tive of whether the activity is protected under the Taft-Hartley Act, and
the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice if he penalizes the partici-
56. Ford Motor Co., Opinion A-151 (H. Shulman 1944), in SHULMAN & CHAM-
BERLAIN, LABOR RELATIONS 47, 49 (1949) : "The obligation to emplby this [grievance]
procedure rather than the work stoppage is a solemn contractual obligation which
law and honor require to be observed. To employ the stoppage when the grievance
procedure is available is to abandon the contract."
57. Bethlehem Steel Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 635, 640 (R. T. Seward 1957) ; Indianapolis
Water Co.-Firemen & Oilers Union contract, CBNC 77:301; American Enka Corp.-
United Textile Workers, AFL, contract, CBNC 77:301.
58. Underwood Glass Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 614 (J. M. Klamon 1956) (twenty-five-
minute stoppage; reduced to suspension); Curtiss-Wright Corp., 20 Lab. Arb. 15
(N. S. Carroll 1952) (mass meiting; discharge reduced to suspension). But see Beth-
lehem Steel Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 72 (R. T. Seward 1958) (discharge for a fifteen-minute
stoppage); International Harvester Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 610 (W. W. Wirtz 1949) (dis-
charge for two leaders of a thirty-minute stoppage).
59. 17 Lab. Arb. 440 (R. N. Latture 1951).
60. E.g., Johns-Manville Corp.-Federal Labor Union, AFL, contract, CBNC
77:301. It is also correct to assess a greater penalty for a strike which is planned to
cause the greatest possible damage to the employer than for a normal walkout. Cf.
NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1953).
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pants. Two examples of such protected strikes are those caused by an
employer's unfair labor practice 0 1 and those caused by conditions dangerous
to health or safety.P Where these factors are present but are not
sufficiently acute to make the stoppage a protected activity, the penalty
should take into account the extenuating cause. For example, where
the company or its agents are partly to blame for the dispute, or where its
agents do not take proper steps to end it, the penalty should be less severe.3
In International Minerals & Chemical Corp.64 the work of one union in-
cluded using a bulldozer to remove a muck heap. At times the pile grew
too quickly for one bulldozer to keep it under control, and there had been
discussions between the union and management about the use of an outside
contractor. The union protested the use of any outside workers each
time it was broached. The employer consulted with the union president
one morning and told him that a subcontractor was to be used to help
reduce the pile. The union objected, and when the employer used the
outside equipment there was a wildcat strike lasting for eight days, after
which three leaders were given two-week layoffs. The arbitrator held
that since the dispute was a continuing matter, the company should have
made earlier efforts to settle it, and should not have acted on such short
notice. Therefore, although the employees admittedly breached the no-
strike clause, their penalty was reduced to a one-week suspension.5
2. Conditional No-Strike Clauses
Since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act there has been an increase
in the use of no-strike clauses which allow strikes when certain conditions
have been met.06 Often the terms of these conditional no-strike clauses
are ambiguous. For example, where the agreement calls for notice to the
employer followed by a cooling-off period before stoppage of work,67 there
may be a question of what constitutes notice and what days are included
within the cooling-off period.68 The weight to be given good-faith com-
61. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); NLRB v. Wooster
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 236 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 353 U.S.
907 (1957).
62. NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957); cf. NLRB v.
American Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1953).
63. Green River Steel Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 774 (J. F. Sembower 1955) (Foreman
first ordered steward home, then told him to remain.); Saco-Lowell Shops, 16 Lab.
Arb. 311 (A. H. Myers 1950) (Superintendent promised employees they would not
have to work overtime in another department, then ordered them to do so.). But cf.
Dalmo Victor Co., 24 Lab. Arb. 33 (S. Kagel 1954) (No discipline involved; employer
had refused to abide by the grievance procedure.).
64. 28 Lab. Arb. 121 (A. R. Marshall 1956).
65. The same analysis is valid for fear of health or safety. Birmingham Slag Co.,
12 Lab. Arb. 56 (W. M. Hepburn 1948) (Employees were afraid to try locomotive in
reverse.). But cf. Paramount Printing & Finishing Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 143 (M. Copelof
1949) (excessive heat).
66. See CBNC 77:1.
67. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954); Ludlow
Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union, CIO, 108 F. Supp. 45 (D. Del. 1952);
see CBNC 77:105.
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pliance with the contract may have important ramifications under the
Taft-Hartley Act8 9 However, as in other areas, the standards of the
Board and the courts are not necessarily adopted by the arbitrator when
he is construing the contract,70 so there need be no analogous result between
an unfair labor practice case and the arbitral review of penalties.
The issue of a dispute over the interpretation of an ambiguous con-
ditional no-strike clause arose in International Harvester Co.71 Here, the
no-strike clause prohibited strikes over disputes which were subject to the
arbitration clause of the contract. That clause in providing for arbitration
of disagreements specifically excepted disputes over the employer's actions
in downgrading job classifications and disputes over the exact coverage of
the arbitration clause itself. The union objected to the employer's reclas-
sification of an established job, and, believing that the action constituted a
"downgrading", attempted to enter bargaining sessions with the employer.
The employer contended that his action was only a reclassification on the
same level, not a "downgrading," and therefore demanded that the union
submit its grievance to arbitration. The union gave the formal strike
notice required by the contract and caused a work stoppage. The employer
suspended the strikers for five days. Upon appeal of this punishment,
the arbitrator agreed with the construction of the contract clause contended
for by the employer, finding that the stoppage was in breach of the contract.
However, he held that punishment was not justified since the violation was
unintentional. The theory of this decision was that since a dispute as
to the outer limit of the arbitration clause was not subject to arbitration,
upon the employer's unilateral decision of this question, the union was left
with no realistic choice but to strike. The alternatives were either to accept
the employer's decision without contest or to strike, assuming the risk that
an arbitrator will subsequently uphold the employer's discipline by inter-
preting the ambiguous language of the coverage of that clause against them.
This was held to be too harsh a dilemma to force upon a bargaining agent,
and therefore a good faith exception was read into the no-strike clause.
The result in this case is correct, but the reasoning appears to attempt
to prove too much. It would seem that the strike in question was
68. Other clauses which may cause uncertainty are those which exempt certain
disputes from the operation of the pledge, as wage renegotiations (California Cotton
Cooperative Ass'n, Ltd., 110 N.L.R.B. 1494 (1954); Continental Can Co.-United
Steelworkers, CIO, contract, CBNC 77:101), or non-arbitrable disputes (NLRB v.
Wagner Iron Works, 220 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 (1956) ;
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Products, 215 F.2d 221 (4th
Cir. 1954)). Some less usual conditions include the company starting suit for money
damages against the union (Cutler-Hammer Co.-International Ass'n of Machinists,
AFL, CBNC 77:103) and the company employing non-union men (Ass'n of Master
Painters-Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, AFL, CBNC 77:104).
69. E.g., if the activity is actually unprotected, the union may be liable in damages.
Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handler's Union, AFL, 235 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956). And if the activity was actually protected,
the employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice if he punishes the participants. NLRB
v. Wagner Iron Works, 220 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 (1956).
70. See McLouth Steel Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 761, 764 (G. E. Bowles 1955).
71. 14 Lab. Arb. 302 (R. T. Seward 1950).
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actually not in violation of the contract at all. A dispute as to the em-
ployer's downgrading a job classification was clearly not subject to
arbitration, but the contract did not provide for arbitration of a disagree-
ment as to what constituted "downgrading." Just as clearly this type of
disagreement was left to traditional collective bargaining methods and
the union was entirely within its rights to apply economic pressure to
buttress its position. On the other hand, where a contract provides for
the arbitration of disputes over the extent of the coverage of the no-strike
clause, neither of the above rationales would apply. Here the union has
bargained away its right to strike in exchange for an opportunity to
challenge the employer's interpretation by arbitration proceedings.
3. Non-Bargaining-Agent Strikes
Arbitrators appear to make the least change in the levied penalty where
the work stoppage is against the interests of the bargaining agent, or at
least without even slight color of union condonation. That is to say the
stoppage is not only sufficiently independent of the bargaining agent so that
it would not be liable in damages, but also is contrary to the wishes of the
bulk of the members. For purposes of discussion, these shall be called
"non-bargaining-agent strikes." Even in the absence of a no-strike clause
such activity has generally been held to be unprotected, and thus discipline
imposed by the employer cannot result in an unfair labor practice charge.72
Arbitral decisions also seem to place this activity in a special class and,
although this is seldom advanced as the reason, affirm the action of the
employer with near uniformity in such situations.73 It has been indicated
that penalties are frequently reduced where the stoppage is short or where
the dispute has touches of employer causation or fear for health,74 but
these same factors do not achieve a comparable result in non-bargaining-
agent strike cases. For example, in Paramount Printing & Finishing Co.,75
several employees complained of excessive heat in one of the processing
rooms. The business agent told them to remain on the job, but they staged
a short walkout. The employer's penalties of discharge for the leader
and one-month layoffs for the others were upheld by the arbitrator. The
decision places no reliance on the union's counselling against the stoppage,
but other cases involving similar disputes would indicate that the penalties
might well have been reduced had the union been neutral in the stoppage.
These results do not appear to be the product of less conscientious
prosecution of the arbitration by the bargaining agent. Once the union
has undertaken the expensive project of arbitration, it seems unlikely that it
72. NLRB v. Local 1229, International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL, 346
U.S. 464 (1953) ; NLRB v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1951).
But see NLRB v. Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 189 F.2d 756 (3d Cir. 1951).
73. E.g., Gardner Denver Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 829 (T. J. Morrissey 1951) ; Bethlehem
Steel Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 99 (M. M. Shipman 1951).
74. See text at notes 61-65 supra.
75. 13 Lab. Arb. 143 (M. Copelof 1949).
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would drag its feet and thus lose whatever respect the winning of such a
cause would give it. More likely, these results arise from the arbitrator's
feeling that there is a wrong in non-bargaining-agent stoppages greater
than that in other violations of the no-strike pledge. Inherent is the judg-
ment that in addition to the employee's duty to respect the contract, there
is a duty to respect the decisions and policies of the bargaining agent.
Where the employee has an alternative available within the bargaining
unit, a work stoppage instituted against the employer is a dereliction
worthy of greater punishment. One example is where the strike challenges
the basic authority of the union to act as collective bargaining agent for the
unit" Here the employee has an obligation to express his ideas to the
other employees in the hope of swaying enough to his view so that another
union can displace the incumbent as majority choice. If employees un-
sympathetic to the bargaining agent choose to stage a work stoppage rather
than seeking their remedy by persuasion of other employees, they have
not only violated their contract with the employer but have also impinged
upon basic concepts of majority rule. Here also, the employees are deserv-
ing of greater punishment.
Another situation occurs where the bargaining agent is willing to
champion the employee's grievance but the employee is unwilling to let
the grievance procedure take its course and stages a work stoppage in-
stead. 77 In Parkway Baking Co.,78 a new production schedule which had
been running for a few months with the concurrence of the union required
the employees to clean the ovens before they left at the end of their shift.
One Friday, two men turned in their time and left without cleaning their
ovens. The next day, the company notified them by telegram that they were
suspended for one day. The employees called their business agent who
told them he would take care of the matter and arranged a meeting with
the company for the next day to discuss their suspension. That night, the
two bakers picketed the bakery in protest of their layoff, stopping vital de-
liveries of materials and holding up production for three hours. They left
only when the business agent forced them to. The employer discharged
them and was upheld by the arbitrator. Even though the original walkout
might not have been enough, resort to self help in disregard of the grievance
procedure justified the discharge.
In the same class are those cases in which a union leader is the
protagonist in a grievance and instigates a strike instead of using the
grievance procedure.79 Since a union leader would generally have access to
76. NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); cf. Harnischfeger
Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953). But see NLRB v. Summers Fertilizer
Co., 251 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1958) (Since union representing employees was company
dominated, they were protected in striking to remove it as representative.).
77. Bethlehem Pacific Coast Steel Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 369 (A. C. Miller 1957);
Nationai Tube Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 404 (R. T. Seward 1949).
78. 21 Lab. Arb. 737 (B. F. Boyer 1953).
79. Oronite Chemical Co., 20 Lab. Arb. 875 (A. E. Ralston, Jr. 1953) ; American
Brake Shoe Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 294 (3. D. Larkin 1949); ef. Borg-Warner Corp., 22
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and control over the grievance machinery, he has no basis for claiming that
such a procedure would not be adequate.
These cases must be distinguished from those involving disputes where
self help may be the employee's sole remedy. It seems clear that were the
union unfairly to favor the interests of the majority over the minority in
bargaining, the minority would have no apt remedy. A recent report
pointed out the following:
"The very structure of the union compels it to represent the in-
terests of the majority. If it fails to do so, it may be unseated by a
rival union or its officers may be defeated for reelection. The more
democratic the union, the more sensitive it is to the wishes of its mem-
bers. However, this is itself a danger, for majority rule may be
destructive of the interests of individuals or a minority, especially when
there are not common but competing interests." 80
An example of such a situation appeared in the United Auto Workers,
where only recently the practice of across-the-board increases, so prejudicial
to the highly-paid craft workers, was discarded."' In the same vein are
stoppages which result when an individual is unfairly discriminated against
by the union with reference to a grievance.82
"Grievance handling offers the Union opportunities for sibtle
discriminations which do not exist in the negotiations of general rules
for the future. Loyal unionists may have their grievances pressed
promptly to a successful conclusion while workers who have not
joined the union or who opposed the business agent in the last election
find it harder to obtain favorable adjustments." 8-
The general conclusion of recent publications is that the individual's
access to the grievance procedure is very limited.8 4 Theoretically, section
9(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act 85 promises him a right to raise his grievance
Lab. Arb. 589 (J. D. Larkin 1954) (discharge of chairman of grievance committee
upheld after he continually refused to use the grievance procedure, saying the men
would not go back to work until the dispute was settled).
80. ABA Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Employer Con-
tracts, Individual Grievances, in ABA, PROCMnINGS OP THZ SECTION oN LABOR LAW
33, 41 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Individual Grievances); see Cox, Duty of Fair
Representation, 2 V.LANovA L. Rzv. 151 (1957); Note, Duty of Union to Minority
Groups in the Bargaining Unit, 65 HARV. L. REv. 490 (1952).
81. See also Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Arm-
strong Cork Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1955) ; motormen's strike in the New York sub-
way system, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1957, p. 27, col. 6.
82. Cf. H. J. Heinz Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 664 (P. N. Lehoczky 1951); Borg-Warner
Corp., 13 Lab. Arb. 710 (C. M. Updegraff 1949).
83. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. Rnv. 601, 630 (1956) ; see
Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50
CoLUM. L. RZv. 731, 759 (1950).
84. See Individual Grievances 50-69; Lenhoff, The Effect of Labor Arbitration
Clauses Upon the Individual, 9 ARB. J. (n.s.) 3 (1954).
85. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952): " ... Provided, That any
individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to pre-
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with management, but unions can and do avoid this by a clause in the
agreement or by a waiver of the right in the application for membership.8 6
Even in the absence of absolute proscription the grievance procedure ends
early for the individual-he cannot compel arbitration since he is not con-
sidered a party to the agreement. t  In these cases, work stoppage is the
only pressure an employee can bring to bear on the union8 8s and the em-
ployer to compel fair treatment. Although most of these activities would
be classed unprotected since they are not for the common benefit and may
also be violations of the no-strike clause, the fact that the stoppage was
against the interests of the bargaining agent should not be taken into ac-
count in imposing penalties.
IV. EQUALITY OF TREATMENT
The employer's need and justification for penalties are limited by
pragmatic considerations. If half an employer's working force were to
participate in a stoppage, to discharge them or even subject them to a long
layoff would often inconvenience the employer even more than those being
punished. Such widespread reduction of the working force might often
mean a shutdown of the whole plant. This problem has led some arbitra-
tors to grant a freer hand to employers after a stoppage.8 9 For example,
Goodyear Atomic CorpY° involved a walkout of 1,500 employees in viola-
tion of a no-strike clause. The employer gave a two-week layoff to the
first forty-eight who punched out. The arbitrator upheld these penalties,
saying that the company had to take disciplinary action and had to take it
with a small group or the plant would shut down. He therefore approved
this method of choosing those who should be penalized as reasonable under
the circumstances.
More often if the discipline is challenged in arbitration, the em-
ployer will have the burden of proving that these men were actually more
deserving of punishment than the other participants.9 1 This idea is illu-
strated by a statement from an opinion of Whitley P. McCoy:
sent grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not incon-
sistent with the terms of a collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect;
Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be
present at such adjustment."
86. See Individual Grievances 53-54.
87. Arsenault v. General Elec. Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 413, 137 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct.
1957) ; see Lenhoff, The Effect of Labor Arbitration Clauses Upon the Individual, 9
ARE. J. (n.s.) 3, 8-9 (1954). Even were he able to force arbitration, it is unlikely that
an individual would be able to bear half the cost of the process.
88. The union may also be under pressure to end an unauthorized walkout. Even
if it is not liable in damages, a non-bargaining-agent strike may shake the employer's
confidence in the union.
89. International Harvester Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 239 (H. H. Platt 1953) ; cf. NLRB
v. American Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1953) (Employer did not commit
an unfair labor practice when it rehired all but twelve of the strikers; no discussion
that these were more guilty than others.).
90. 27 Lab. Arb. 321 (P. N. Lehoczky 1956).
91. McLouth Steel Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 761 (G. E. Bowles 1955) ; Chrysler Corp.,
17 Lab. Arb. 814 (D. A. Wolff 1952). But see George Groton Mach. Co., CBNC
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"In a case of this kind, especially in view of the no-strike clause of
the contract, it is generally held that the Company may discipline all
who walk out, but it must treat all charged with the same offense
alike. If it chooses not to discipline all who walk out, but only the
leaders, it must prove leadership, and the discipline imposed must bear
a fair relationship to the degree of guilt. It cannot, for want of proof,
merely pick out some to set an example to others. Nor may it pick out
those who, because of prior incidents, it feels morally certain must have
instigated the trouble." 92
And unlike those cases where the arbitrator feels the penalty is too severe
and reduces it, if the employer is unable to prove a reasonable basis for the
distribution in punishment the arbitrator will strike out the distinction com-
pletely, and the employer may have his right to punish for the stoppage
completely foreclosed. 3 Therefore, it is important to consider some of the
distinctions which arbitrators have held to be permissible.
A. Incitement or Maintenance
Where the company is able to prove that the disciplined employees
engaged in strike violence, distinction in penalties will be upheld.94 It is
also clear that a greater penalty can be assessed against employees who or-
ganize a stoppage or try to convince others to join it,95 and against em-
ployees who spread the stoppage by notifying others of it.96 One case
which touches on several of these considerations is Oronite Chemical Co. 9 7
The production worker involved could not start work until chemicals were
brought to him. Since the porter was not in the area, his foreman asked
him to bring the chemicals in himself. Although this would not have
involved arduous work, the employee told the foreman that such work was
not in his job description and refused to get the chemicals. The foreman
told him to get them or leave. The employee, who was himself a shop
steward, got in touch with the president of the local and with the inter-
77:325, 327 (machinists contract, in which the union agrees to "leave the company
free to discipline (including discharge) any employee involved, without necessarily
disciplining all employees so involved; and such action shall not be held to be dis-
criminatory.").
92. Rheem Mfg. Co., 8 Lab. Arb. 85, 87 (1947) ; see International Harvester Co.,
16 Lab. Arb. 695 (R. T. Seward 1951).
93. Aurora Gasoline Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 495 (R. G. Howlett 1957). But see Inter-
national Minerals & Chemical Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 121 (A. R. Marshall 1956) (no
proof of incitement; two-week layoff reduced to one week).
94. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 767 (C. R. Schedler 1956) ; cf.
Administrative Ruling of Gen. Counsel, Case F-253, CCH LAB. CAs. f[ 55,128 (1958).
95. H. J. Heinz Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 664 (P. N. Lehoczky 1951) ; Fern Shoe Co., 14
Lab. Arb. 268 (J. A. C. Grant 1950); cf. Borg-Warner Corp., 4 Lab. Arb. 4 (C. M.
Updegraff 1945).
96. Hawaiian Agricultural Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 142 (H. S. Burr 1957) (Strikers
from main plant visited outlying fields, after which workers there walked out.);
Underwood Glass Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 614 (J. M. Klamon 1956) (Foreman tried to get
a few workers to stay overtime to avoid work cessation while strike was being
settled; grievant followed foreman and advised workers to refuse to work overtime.).
97. 20 Lab. Arb. 875 (A. E. Ralston, Jr. 1953).
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national, and was advised to use his own judgment. The employee told
every man on his shift that he was being sent home and when he left the
whole shift went with him. The company, in compliance with the contract,
notified the local and the international, and discharged the employee the
next day. The arbitrator upheld the discharge, finding a duty to carry the
complaint through the grievance procedure rather than walking out, and
that the only reason for notifying the other employees must have been to
get their support in whatever action he took.98
B. Past Record
Some contracts appear to make incitement or maintenance the only
criteria by which inequality can be justified.9 9 Others make a distinction
between employees who have previously been guilty of participation in a
stoppage and those who have not.0 0 In the absence of such clauses, most
arbitrators rule that the employer can take into account any past occur-
rence for which the employee could have been punished without violating
the seniority clause of the contract.' 0 ' However, a growing group of arbi-
trators limits the use of past record to recent offenses. This latter view is
based on the following reasoning:
"A penalty for any given act should be directed at that act
and should not normally take into account an accumulation of diverse
misdemeanors. To paraphrase this, employees should not be dis-
charged for a work stoppage when in fact they are being discharged
because of an absentee record, or poor workmanship, or any one or
more of a number of other shortcomings. ." "102
Modern ideas of corrective rather than punitive industrial discipline
support this latter view. Yet the employer should have some way to
cumulate certain offenses where the employee is a continual troublemaker.
It would appear that the best approach would be to allow the employer to
consider those offenses for which the employee has been warned, either by
notice and notation on his record or by actual punishment. In this way, the
98. See also American Brake Shoe Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 294, 312 (J. D. Larkin
1949) : "A word from Kelly might have put the men back to work at any time during
the three weeks' strike. All he needed to do was to urge the men to return to work
and to say that his grievance would be taken up as provided [by the contract] ....
(Kelly was a union leader who had been discharged.)
99. Johns-Manville-Federal Labor Union, AFL, contract, CBNC 77:301: "[S]uch
discipline as the company shall determine his degree of participation warrants."
100. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 681 (H. J. Dworkin 1957); Johns-
Manville Corp.-Federal Labor Union, AFL, contract, CBNC 77:301.
101. Wesson Oil & Snowdrift Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 629 (P. M. Kelliher 1957);
Borg-Warner Corp, 22 Lab. Arb. 589 (3. D. Larkin 1954).
102. Glass Container Manufacturers Institute, 27 Lab. Arb. 131, 133 (P. N.
Lehoczky 1956) ; see Aleo Mfg. Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 715 (S. H. Jaffe 1950), enforcemnent
granted sub twm. Textile Workers Union, CIO v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626
(M.D.N.C. 1950).
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employee will have been given an opportunity to correct his attitude toward
his job. In addition, if the distinction is challenged the employer will be
able to support it in arbitration with the real evidence of the employee's
record.
C. Union Leaders
When inequality of treatment results in greater penalty for union
leaders than for the remainder of the participants in the work stoppage, the
employer enters an area where arbitrators are in great disagreement. It
is clear that where a union leader instigates or incites a stoppage, he is
liable to greater punishment in the same way as those not holding office 1
03
-the fact that he is a union leader does not absolve him from punishment
for a violation of the contract. But his union leadership in and of itself is
not proof that he had a larger part in instigating the strike than others.
1
The real area of conflict centers on the issue of whether a union
leader has a greater responsibility to the employer than an ordinary
employee. In a few contracts, this issue is foreclosed. For example, the
contract between the Newport Steel Company and the Steelworkers Union
reads as follows:
"The right of the Company to discipline an employee for viola-
tion of this Agreement shall be limited to the failure of such employee
to discharge his responsibilities as an employee and may not in any
way be based upon the failure of such employee to discharge his re-
sponsibilities as a representative or officer of the Union." 105
Unless it could be argued that only the union leaders are familiar with the
no-strike clause, such a provision would preclude discrimination against
union leaders qua union leaders for a work stoppage.
In the absence of a contract clause bearing on the issue, some arbi-
trators would require the union leaders to take positive action toward
counselling the employees to avoid the stoppage or return to work. 06 In
103. International Harvester Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 610 (W. W. Wirtz 1949); cf.
Michigan Lumber Fabricators, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 579 (1955).
104. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 681 (H. J. Dworkin 1957); Aurora
Gasoline Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 495 (R. G. Howlett 1957). But cf. Bower Roller Bearing
Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 320 (G. E. Bowles 1954) (steward's position of respect used as
circumstantial evidence of incitement); International Harvester Co., 21 Lab. Arb.
239 (H. H. Platt 1953) (employer upheld in firing union leaders who were among
those distributing leaflets, since they were the only ones familiar to its representative).
105. CBNC 77:302-03.
106. Skenandoa Rayon Corp., 21 Lab. Arb. 421 (I. R. Feinberg 1953) ; Ford Motor
Co., Opinion A-153 (H. Shulman 1944), in SHULMAN & CHAMBERLAIN, LAmOR RELA-
TIONs 432, 434 (1949) : "It is not a breach of loyalty to his men to insist that they per-
form their duties and bring no reproach upon their union. Indeed, true loyalty to his
men, as well as to his union and to the contract, requires [the committeeman] to do
just that; and to do it at the very time when his men are disinclined to heed his
advice. When his men are bent on a wildcat strike and picketing violative of the
contract . . . his duty is to continue his efforts to dissuade them. If he fails to do
this, he is at least not to join them and give them leadership."
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International Harvester Co. 10 7 a new contract entered into after a long and
costly strike made certain changes which resulted in less benefits for the
employees. After three months the employees decided that the employer
was not acting in good faith on their gievances and authorized a strike.
One morning before the day shift arrived, several employees stood in front
of the plant handing out leaflets and urging employees to attend a meeting
to be held that afternoon, on company time. The company tried to get the
union leaders among them to aid in heading off the stoppage. When they
refused, six were discharged-the union president, vice president, a steward
and two committeemen. This action was upheld by the arbitrator. Al-
though others participated in handing out leaflets, these were the only ones
with whom the representatives of the employer were sufficiently familiar to
identify. In addition, it was held that these respected union leaders had a
responsibility to enforce compliance with their contract, and other partici-
pants had neither the authority nor the responsibility to do what the
aggrieved were expected to do. Although this view appears to be among
the majority, it is not universally held. 0 8
Also in the majority are those arbitrators who hold union leaders
to a duty to remain on the job when the rest of the employees walk out.10 9
In Ross Gear & Tool Co.110 the employer unilaterally changed the incentive
rate in one department. The employees were dissatisfied with the new
rate and threatened a walkout. Three shop stewards tried to get in touch
with the international representative to head off the strike but when this
failed they walked out with the men. All three were given two-week
suspensions whereas none of the other participants got any punishment.
This distinction was upheld by Pearce Davis, who said, "Local union of-
ficials are bound, by virtue of their office, to set personal examples of op-
position to contract violation. They cannot be passive; they must vigor-
ously seek to prevent contract violations by their constituents." "I Only
a few cases have held that a union leader's duty is over once he tries to
convince the men to remain on the job and that if they persist in the
walkout, he may join them without subjecting himself to greater penalties
than the rest of the strikers."12
Some distinction between union leaders and the remainder of the
working force seems justified. As has been said above 113 a union leader
107. 21 Lab. Arb. 239 (H. H. Platt 1953).
108. Bower Roller Bearing Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 320 (G. E. Bowles 1954) ; Inter-
national Harvester Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 75 (R. T. Seward 1950).
109. Bethlehem Pac. Coast Steel Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 369 (A. C. Miller 1957);
Ford Motor Co., 6 Lab. Arb. 799 (H. Shulman 1947): "The strikers here should
have been told plainly that it was their duty to all to stay on their jobs, . . . and the
only way to make such instructions meaningful is to have other employees, particularly
union representatives, do the work when the instructions are not heeded. That is not
scabbing or acting like a heel. It is honorable and courageous leadership in the perform-
ance of a moral and legal duty....
110. 28 Lab. Arb. 782 (1957).
111. Id. at 791.
112. Aurora Gasoline Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 495 (R. G. Howlett 1957) ; Borg-Warner
Corp., 4 Lab. Arb. 4 (C. M. Updegraff 1945).
113. See text at note 80 supra.
DISCIPLINING NO-STRIKE CLAUSE VIOLATORS
who has a grievance has a higher obligation to seek redress through the
contractual procedure because he has sure access to and control over the
grievance procedure and because he is an agent of a group whose integrity
is injured by a breach of the contract. On the other hand, when the
protagonist in the dispute is someone other than the union leader himself
the extent to which the union leader's duty differs from that of other em-
ployees should be subject to greater limitations.
If every union leader worked actively to head off a strike by attempt-
ing to convince the workers that such a breach of their contractual obli-
gation is not to their best interests and by emphasizing the agreed-upon
grievance procedures, and refused to walk out with them, it is unlikely that
the strike would get past the talking stage."14 An employer could best
achieve this result were he permitted to lay heavier penalties on any union
officers who participate in any way in the stoppage. But if the extra duty
is made unreasonably high, the employer might be provided with an excuse
for discharging any union officers whom he feels have been uncooperative.
It might also act as a deterrent to a workman's trying to become a union
leader, since by doing so he would run the risk of greater penalties if a
work stoppage were to occur.
In light of these considerations it would seem that where a dispute
arises which threatens to precipitate a work stoppage in violation of the
contract, the only duties of a union leader ought to be to inform the dispu-
tant about the grievance machinery and try to induce him to use it, and to
notify the higher authorities within the local and the international with an
eye towards settling the dispute peaceably. If he fails in these he is deserv-
ing greater penalties. If the workmen insist on striking, the union leader
ought to have no more duty to remain on the job than any other worker.
To ask him to do so is to run against human nature. H. M. Teaf has
phrased it this way:
"The arbitrator believes that it is expecting too much of an
ordinary human being, even if a Union official, under the compulsions
that always exist in group relations (even where there is no binding
element such as Union membership) and under pressures for social es-
teem of his fellows, to ask that he take a course different from that of
the group. These compulsions are all the more powerful when emotions
are aroused, as they must have been in the present case not long after
the sitdown started. [As a steward put it], he would have separated
himself from the rest of the employees had he returned to his bench." 15
It might be suggested that even where the union leader fails in these
duties punishment ought to flow from the union and not from the employer.
Every employee has a duty to the employer not to participate in work
114. See Bethlehem Pac. Coast Steel Corp., 28 Lab. Arb. 369 (A. C. Miller 1957);
American Brake Shoe Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 294 (J. D. Larkin 1949).
115. C & D Batteries, Inc., 16 Lab. Arb. 198, 208 (1951).
1958]
1020 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
stoppages. As a union leader the employee's extra duties are to the mem-
bers of the union-to maintain the union's reputation for integrity to the
contract and to try to discourage activities which might subject his men
to discipline. It is the union, and not the employer, which is directly in-
jured when the leader is derelict in this duty. It is recognized, however,
that since arbitrators have so generally permitted employer discipline on
these matters it would be inequitable to withdraw this power without notice.
The economic loss suffered by employers whose disciplinary punishments
are overturned in arbitration can ofttimes be serious, e.g., reinstatement
with back pay after loss of production from the employee during a period of
dismissal or suspension. The most desirable solution would be for the
contract to provide for union punishment of dereliction by union leaders
upon the employer's petition.1"3 This solution is actually favorable to
employers in that the union is able to use a greater range of penalties than
the employer, including the meaningful one of a fine. In addition, the
recipient of discipline from the employer is often able to enlist the sym-
pathy and support of other workers in a further stoppage. If the discipline
is meted out by the union, other employees are more likely to respect it.
Of course, if such a procedure is to be effective, there would have to be
some method of the employer's challenging the punishment through
grievance and arbitration, if it considers the punishment insufficient.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
At the end of a work stoppage, the employer is most interested in
getting the men back to work as quickly and quietly as possible and doing
all he can to avoid such stoppages in the future. If the stoppage was un-
protected the employer may find penalizing the employees who participated
in it is the best way to reach these two aims. The employer must follow
the procedures set out in the contract and, if its action is subject to chal-
lenge under the grievance procedure, must see that the imposed penalties
reflect various considerations. Because of the difference in the standards
of individual arbitrators, it is impossible to make a categorical evaluation of
the factors which must influence the employer's determination. However,
if the employer makes a conscientious effort to consider the gravity of the
stoppage the underlying cause of the dispute, and to distinguish in penalties
between individual employees only on proper grounds, it will achieve a
sanction which will not unduly prejudice labor-management relations and
which will be sustained by most arbitrators.
M.S.E.
116. Cf. text at note 47 mtpra.
